训练一个在编码上表现出色但同时又不是优秀黑客的一般模型非常困难。由于编码已成为 AI 最大的盈利来源,开发者面临着保持这些能力持续改进的压力,即使他们在寻找限制滥用的方法时也是如此。
因此,前沿开发者越来越多地依赖其他缓解措施。一个方法是有选择地限制模型提供的网络安全援助类型。例如,Anthropic 的 Opus 5 可以搜索未编译源码中的漏洞,但不能搜索已编译的软件,根据该模型的系统卡:https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/b514064af1408018e64b1ad24e7d5e75850b4ffd/Claude%20Opus%205%20System%20Card.pdf。其原因是,这使得使用 Opus 5 进行进攻性操作更加困难。
中国领导人越来越承认先进 AI 的风险。在上个月的世界人工智能大会上,中国国家主席习近平强调:https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/17/business/xi-jinping-china-ai.html?eafs_enabled=false 开放权重模型的重要性,同时也强调确保 AI 仍在严格人类控制下的必要性。
斯坦福大学网络政策中心研究中国 AI 政策的 Graham Webster 告诉 TechCrunch,中国有健全的 AI 监管法规,但这些规则历来主要关注政治敏感内容、虚假信息和社会稳定,而非灾难性 AI 风险,如进攻性网络能力和生物滥用。
“总体来说,美国的 AI 思想家更关注这一生存性灾难威胁,而中国社区不太关注,”Webster 说,并补充道,许多中国政策研究人员认为,如果真的出现新的前沿风险,美国公司可能会首先遇到它。
支持开放权重AI的倡导者认为,发布权重对于网络安全很重要,因为它使公司能够防御攻击——Hugging Face 曾依靠 GLM-5.2 来防御 OpenAI 的泄露——且因为如果公司知道未来可能出现的威胁,就能更好地做准备。
“Hugging Face CEO Clem Delangue 本周在社交媒体帖子中表示:‘同样帮助阻止 AI 驱动的网络攻击的系统,现在可以帮助防御每天数百万次的网络攻击,同时帮助我们在攻击者利用漏洞之前识别并修复这些漏洞。’ https://x.com/ClementDelangue/status/2083908468285620415
YouTuber Hank Green 表示他的人工智能使用“不健康”:https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/01/youtuber-hank-green-says-his-ai-usage-is-not-healthy/ Anthony Ha:https://techcrunch.com/author/anthony-ha/
WhatsApp 正在测试一个用于大型企业消息的新文件夹:https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/31/whatsapp-is-testing-a-new-folder-for-messages-from-large-businesses/ Ivan Mehta:https://techcrunch.com/author/ivan-mehta/
Claude Opus 5 在被分配管理自动售货机任务时变得相当无情:https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/29/claude-opus-5-became-downright-ruthless-when-tasked-with-running-a-vending-machine/ Julie Bort:https://techcrunch.com/author/julie-bort/
As policymakers debate how to govern increasingly powerful AI systems like OpenAI’s GPT-5.6 Sol and Anthropic’s Mythos, a Chinese open-weight model has narrowed the gap with the industry’s leaders.
GLM-5.2, the open-weight AI model from China’s Z.ai, is only a few months behind OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 and Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.7 on cyber and bio capabilities, according to a new report:https://www.safer-ai.org/research/glm-5-2-evaluation-report from AI safety nonprofit SaferAI. But the divide between frontier capabilities and safety practices is growing.
According to SaferAI’s evaluation, which the nonprofit ran via Z.ai’s public API, GLM-5.2 refused none of the offensive cyber or dual-use biology tasks it was given. By comparison, Claude Opus 4.7 “refused so consistently that SaferAI could not complete CyberGym on it at all.” (CyberGym is a benchmark that evaluates cybersecurity capabilities. OpenAI used it in the evaluation that preceded last month’s Hugging Face breach:https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/21/openai-says-hugging-face-was-breached-by-its-pre-release-models/.)
It’s a stark reminder of what some critics have warned for years: that open-weight AI models could put highly capable AI into the hands of potential attackers, with no way to police how they use the technology once they download the weights. With open-weight models rapidly approaching the capabilities of the world’s leading AI systems, the debate is moving from whether they can compete to how society manages risks once they are released.
“The frontier of capability is not the frontier of risk, and so we do have to take into account the state of the mitigations as well to assess the risk properly,” Henry Papadatos, executive director of SaferAI, told TechCrunch.
While Z.ai could apply safety measures to its hosted API, those protections become unenforceable once someone runs the weights on their own hardware, where they can remove or modify any safeguards, fine-tune the models, or change system prompts.
Frontier developers like OpenAI and Anthropic tend to rely on safeguards like classifiers, refusal training, and API-level controls to limit dangerous cyber and biological assistance.
Those measures are far from foolproof: jailbreaks routinely bypass protections on deployed models. Far.ai, an AI safety nonprofit, found hundreds of universal jailbreaks:https://leaderboard.far.ai/ — defined as reusable keys that succeed on most harmful requests — in frontier models like xAI’s Grok 4.5 and Google DeepMind’s Gemini 3.1 Pro. According to the report, jailbreaks succeed when attackers combine multiple manipulation techniques — including roleplaying, authority impersonation, fake conversation history, and follow-up prompts — to amplify weak points in a model’s defenses.
But the safeguards in place for closed models don’t work at all on open-weight models, which are designed to run on any infrastructure with any set of safeguards — or lack thereof.
“The objective should clearly be that the good capabilities — the safe ones — are accessible to anyone, and then we try to remove the bad ones, even in an open source fashion,” Papadatos said.
One technique Papadatos noted could help is called “pre-training data filtering,” which is when an AI company removes offensive cybersecurity information from their training data and then trains the model on the curated dataset.
Some research:https://alignment.anthropic.com/2025/pretraining-data-filtering/?utm suggests this can reduce hazardous biological knowledge:https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.06601#:~:text=In%20this%20paper%2C%20we%20investigate,as%20a%20more%20tamper%2Dresistant%20safeguard. without harming overall model performance. However, for cybersecurity, data filtering is much less practical.
It’s difficult to train a general model that excels at coding but isn’t also a good hacker. Because coding has become AI’s biggest moneymaker, developers face pressure to keep improving those capabilities even as they search for ways to limit misuse.
Because of that, frontier developers have increasingly relied on other mitigations instead. One approach has been to selectively restrict the kinds of cybersecurity assistance models will provide. Anthropic’s Opus 5, for example, can search for vulnerabilities in uncompiled source code, but not compiled software, per the model’s system card:https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/b514064af1408018e64b1ad24e7d5e75850b4ffd/Claude%20Opus%205%20System%20Card.pdf. The reasoning is that this makes it harder to use Opus 5 for offensive purposes.
Others include rigorous pre-deployment safety evaluations, publishing risk assessments, and withholding model weights if a system is perceived as too dangerous.
In GLM-5.2’s case, SaferAI says Z.ai didn’t publish a safety framework, pre-deployment testing commitments, or risk assessment for the model. TechCrunch has asked Z.ai whether it conducted internal or third-party frontier safety evaluations before release, but did not receive a response.
Chinese leaders have increasingly acknowledged the risks of advanced AI. At the World AI Conference last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized:https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/17/business/xi-jinping-china-ai.html?eafs_enabled=false the importance of open-weight models, while also stressing the necessity of ensuring AI remains a tool under strict human control.
Graham Webster, who studies Chinese AI policy at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, told TechCrunch that China has robust regulations governing AI, but those rules have historically focused on politically sensitive content, misinformation, and social stability rather than catastrophic AI risks like offensive cyber capabilities and biological misuse.
“U.S. AI thinkers are, in general, more concerned with this existential catastrophic [idea] than the Chinese community,” Webster said, adding that many Chinese policy researchers believe that if there’s truly going to be a novel frontier risk, American companies will likely encounter it first.
“The Chinese system has confidence that they control the use of these technologies inside China,” Webster continued. “Being online in China is something you do attributed to your real name, and companies can be held accountable, users can be held accountable.”
Webster mused that the same mechanism that model providers use for refusing to engage on certain political topics can potentially be tweaked to make sure models refuse to complete offensive cyber attacks or won’t deliver adverse biological engineering outcomes. He added that because Chinese companies tend to coordinate with regulators behind the scenes, it can be tough to know what internal testing they’re conducting before release.
Advocates of open-weight AI argue that releasing the weights is important for cybersecurity because it allows companies defend themselves against attacks — Hugging Face relied on GLM-5.2 to defend itself against OpenAI’s breach — and because it allows them to better prepare for future threats if they know what’s coming.
“The same systems that helped stop an AI-powered cyberattack can now help defend against millions of cyberattacks every day, while helping us identify and fix vulnerabilities before attackers exploit them,” Clem Delangue, CEO of Hugging Face, said this week in a social media post:https://x.com/ClementDelangue/status/2083908468285620415.
Papadatos said that benefit is often overstated, and doesn’t mean “we should open-source dangerous capabilities.”
“The main point in my mind is that we shouldn’t just accept that dangerous capabilities are easily accessible by anyone anywhere,” he said, stressing that he believes the industry should be striving for only making the “good capabilities” easily accessible. By default attackers adopt new tools faster than defenders do. For example, a ransomware group can change its methods in a week. A hospital cannot.”
When you purchase through links in our articles, we may earn a small commission:https://techcrunch.com/techcrunch-affiliate-monetization-standards/. This doesn’t affect our editorial independence.
Rebecca Bellan is a senior reporter at TechCrunch where she covers the business, policy, and emerging trends shaping artificial intelligence. Her work has also appeared in Forbes, Bloomberg, The Atlantic, The Daily Beast, and other publications.
You can contact or verify outreach from Rebecca by emailing rebecca.bellan@techcrunch.com:mailto:rebecca.bellan@techcrunch.com or via encrypted message at rebeccabellan.491 on Signal.
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Influencers draw backlash for attending OpenAI’s first luxury trip:https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/03/influencers-draw-backlash-for-attending-openais-first-luxury-trip/ Dominic-Madori Davis:https://techcrunch.com/author/dominic-madori-davis/
YouTuber Hank Green says his AI usage is ‘not healthy’:https://techcrunch.com/2026/08/01/youtuber-hank-green-says-his-ai-usage-is-not-healthy/ Anthony Ha:https://techcrunch.com/author/anthony-ha/
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Claude Opus 5 became downright ruthless when tasked with running a vending machine:https://techcrunch.com/2026/07/29/claude-opus-5-became-downright-ruthless-when-tasked-with-running-a-vending-machine/ Julie Bort:https://techcrunch.com/author/julie-bort/
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情报判断
Aioga 编辑摘要
SaferAI 经由 Z.ai 公共 API 评估称,GLM-5.2 在网络与生物能力上仅落后 GPT-5.5 和 Claude Opus 4.7 数月;面对测试中的攻击性网络及双重用途生物任务时,该模型未拒绝任何一项。
背景分析
GLM-5.2 是中国 Z.ai 的开源权重模型。材料指出,托管 API 可部署安全措施,但权重下载并在本地运行后,使用者可修改防护、系统提示或继续微调,原提供方的相关控制难以强制执行。